Ukraine’s counter-offensive has left Putin encircled at home

Kyiv’s military successes have forced the Russian president into making choices he wished to avoid

By Ivan Krastev

The writer is an FT contributing editor and chair of the Centre for Liberal Strategies, Sofia, and fellow at IWM Vienna  

“The genius of Ukrainian military commanders,” Canadian analyst Michael MacKay tweeted early this week, “is to manoeuvre their forces to where the Russians aren’t, forcing Russians to retreat from where they are.” This is precisely what transpired on Russia’s domestic front too. While Russian troops avoided being encircled by retreating, Vladimir Putin found himself politically encircled in Moscow.  

Just as the word “war” has finally made an appearance in government-controlled media (previously the invasion of Ukraine had been referred to as a “special military operation”), it is hardliners demanding total mobilisation who have become the Russian president’s biggest problem.  

After failing to capture Kyiv and topple Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskyy, the Kremlin unveiled a strategy that can be summarised as follows: capture as much territory as possible with the available manpower; inflict as much damage as possible on Ukraine’s economy; and organise referendums on annexing occupied territories, thereby creating a sense of inevitability.  

This strategy, the Kremlin believed, would break Ukraine’s resolve and discourage Kyiv’s western allies from continuing to arm Zelenskyy’s troops.  

By freezing the conflict on its terms, the Kremlin sought to gain the upper hand, and eliminate the need for any forced military mobilisation. Just 64 days before the Russian retreat, Kremlin first deputy chief of staff Sergei Kirienko was reported as saying: “We view the liberated territories as part of our empire and part of our state.”  

For a while this looked like a winning strategy. Ukraine was preparing for a war of attrition and high energy prices softened the shock of western sanctions on Moscow.  

It is true that Russia’s economic elite was gloomy, but they were at least obedient. And opinion polls have suggested that a majority of Russians back Putin’s aggression against Ukraine. Many people believe that even if this is not their war, Russia is still their country.  

However, this entire carefully designed strategic edifice was shattered in a matter of days. The Ukrainian counter-offensive has emboldened western political leaders who insist that Kyiv should receive the arms it needs and that the Russian army must not only be stopped, but defeated.  

Recent military clashes on the border between Armenia and Azerbaijan are a sign that some of Moscow’s neighbours sense Russian weakness and are ready to unfreeze previously intractable conflicts in the post-Soviet space.  

Meanwhile on Thursday Putin, sitting with Chinese leader Xi Jinping and others from an authoritarian rogue’s gallery at a meeting in Uzbekistan, was forced to explain why Russia is not winning.  

The growing pressure on Putin to declare war and start the mobilisation of forces has put the Kremlin on the ropes, and forces choices the Russian president has tried to avoid since the invasion began.  

In the eyes of reasonable people, the Kremlin’s refusal to call its assault on Ukraine a war is simply a sign of deep cynicism.  

For many ordinary Russians, however, that decision is of great significance. A “special military operation” is something to be cheered, while war is something to be feared.  

The Russian attack on Georgia in 2008 was a “special operation”, likewise Moscow’s involvement in the conflict in Syria. The confrontation with Nazi Germany, on the other hand, was a war.  

Special operations are conflicts which can be lost without a population really noticing. But when you lose a war you risk losing your country. The lesson many Russians drew from the end of the cold war, for example, was that even if you are a nuclear power you should not take your survival for granted.  

Predicting what happens in Moscow after Russian troops have been humiliated in Ukraine is not easy. But it is safe to say that while Putin is not in danger of losing power, he has lost his room for manoeuvre. The Kremlin fears that mass mobilisation could reveal the internal weakness of the regime.  

It could also expose the selfishness of Russian elites. In the event of mobilisation, the sons of Putin’s praetorian guard would either flee the country or end up in hospital to avoid the draft. Corruption would paralyse the system. And while, at least initially, it is unlikely that people will revolt, they will do what Russians do best: drag their feet.  

Putin has resisted any effort at mass mobilisation for the same reason that he was reluctant to impose mandatory vaccination during the Covid pandemic: the fear that such a move would expose his lack of control.  

This is the cardinal difference between democracy and autocracy: even weak democratic governments are able to preserve their legitimacy, whereas the legitimacy of the autocrat depends on how strong the public perceives them to be. And contrary to the claims of Kremlin propaganda, while most Russians are ready to cheer on their army, they are much less enthusiastic about joining up.  

The only option left to Putin, if he resists a mass call-up, is to plunge Ukraine further into darkness. In the short-term, therefore, Kyiv’s counter-offensive is likely to mean escalation rather than ceasefire. 

Ivan Krastev is Chairman, Centre for Liberal Strategies, Sofia
Permanent Fellow, Institute for Human Sciences, IWM Vienna